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The main criticism Pfeiffer advances in his commentary is that our proposal is too
narrow. Embodied simulation (ES), in his view equated to motor resonance, is not
a sufficiently primary mechanism on which we can base a unified neurobiological
theory of the earliest sense of self and others. According to Pfeiffer, motor reson-
ance needs to be complemented by other more basic and primary mechanisms.
Hence, as an alternative to our proposal, he suggests that multisensory spatial
processing can play this role, primarily contributing to the earliest foundation of
the sense of self and others. In our reply we stress on the one hand that identify-
ing ES only with motor resonance is a partial view that may give rise to falla-
cious arguments,  since ES also deals  with  emotions  and sensations.  We also
show, on the other hand, that ES and multisensory integration should not be seen
as alternative solutions to the problem of the neural bases of the bodily self, be-
cause multimodal integration carried out by the cortical motor system is an in-
stantiation of ES. We conclude by stressing the role ES might have played in the
transition from bodily experience to symbolic expression.
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1 An overview of Pfeiffer’s criticisms
We would like to thank Christian Pfeiffer for his
very well-articulated commentary on our paper
“The paradigmatic body: Embodied Simulation,
Intersubjectivity,  the  Bodily  Self,  and  Lan-
guage” (Gallese &  Cuccio this collection). His
comments and criticisms offered us the oppor-
tunity to further reflect on some of the ideas
proposed in  our piece.  The aim of  our paper
was to discuss the role of the body in the con-
stitution of the earliest and primary sense of self
and  others  and,  also,  to  emphasize  the  con-
stitutive role of the body in a specifically hu-
man modality of intersubjectivity: language. To
be more precise, we identified a biological mech-
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anism, embodied simulation (ES), as a primary
source of intersubjectivity, the sense of self, and
language. The mechanism of ES is widely de-
scribed in the paper and its role in human cog-
nition is explained by also resorting to the Aris-
totelian notion of paradeigma.
The  commentary  offered  by  Christian
Pfeiffer  is  focused  on a  partial  aspect  of  our
much wider proposal. In fact, the author only
discusses the constitutive role motor resonance
has for the sense of self and for social cognition.
However, motor resonance is just one dimension
of the mechanism of ES. As argued in our paper
and elsewhere (see  Gallese &  Sinigaglia 2011a;
Gallese 2014)  the  mechanism of  simulation  is
widespread in the brain and it also characterizes
the nervous structures  involved in the experi-
ence of emotions and sensations. All these di-
mensions of ES should be taken into account.
To identify ES only with motor resonance is a
partial view that may give rise to fallacious ar-
guments. 
The main criticism Pfeiffer advances in his
commentary is that our proposal for the con-
stitutive role of motor resonance is too narrow.
ES,  in  his  view  equated  to  motor  resonance,
cannot be the primary neurobiological mechan-
ism at the basis of both the sense of self and
others.  According to Pfeiffer,  motor resonance
needs to be complemented by other more basic
and primary mechanisms. Hence, as an alternat-
ive to our proposal, he suggests that multisens-
ory spatial processing can play this role, primar-
ily contributing to the earliest foundation of the
sense of self and others. To support this claim,
he provides theoretical arguments and presents
empirical data structured in three different sec-
tions.  Each  of  these  sections  supposedly
provides  evidence  of  the  role  of  multisensory
spatial processing in the foundation of a bodily
sense of self and others.
In the first section Pfeiffer addresses the
issue of  intersubjectivity and presents the At-
tention  schema  theory  (AS).  In  his  proposal,
our  ability  to  understand  others  is  primarily
based on a mechanism more primitive than ES-
as-motor-resonance: spatial coding of attention.
AS  predicts  that  we  understand  the  current
state of awareness of our conspecifics by means
of  schematic  representations  of  their  states  of
attention (Pfeiffer this collection, p. 4). In other
words, according to AS, by using a representa-
tion of the spatial relationship between the indi-
vidual we are observing and the spatial focus of
her/his attention we can likely predict his inten-
tions and, as a consequence, his actions. Pfeiffer
(this collection, p. 4) also discusses recent em-
pirical findings on the neural structures under-
lying the AS. It  seems that the neural  struc-
tures  for  the  spatial  coding  of  attention  are
based  in  the  right  temporo-parietal  junctio
(TPJ)  and  in  the  superior  temporal  sulcus
(STS). These neural structures do not overlap
with the neural circuits involved in ES.
In the second section Pfeiffer addresses the
issue of the bodily foundation of the sense of
self. The experience of being a bodily self can
be decomposed into four different aspects (Pfeif-
fer this collection, p. 5): body ownership, self-
location,  first-person  perspective,  and  agency.
According to Pfeiffer, motor resonance can ac-
count only for body ownership and agency, dir-
ectly contributing to these (non-spatial) aspects
of the bodily self. However, for the two spatial
components of the bodily self we need a differ-
ent account. In fact, according to Pfeiffer, em-
pirical evidence suggests that these spatial as-
pects of the bodily self, which imply multisens-
ory  spatial  representations,  are  encoded  in  a
brain region, the TPJ, not characterized by mo-
tor  resonance.  Hence,  motor  resonance,  while
being still necessary for the bodily foundation of
some basic  aspects  of  the self,  is  not  a suffi-
ciently  primary  mechanism,  since  different
neural structures are also needed for the bodily
foundation of the self. In support of this claim,
Pfeiffer  discusses  data  from  neurological  pa-
tients  with  out-of-body experiences  and other
kinds of altered states. 
Finally,  in  the  third  section  the  con-
stitutive  role  of  the  vestibular  system to  the
bodily foundation of both the consciousness of
self and others is discussed. It is proposed that
this  system,  which  encodes  gravity  and  head
motion and is associated with multisensory spa-
tial processing, significantly and primarily con-
tributes  to  our  ability  to  distinguish  between
motions of our own body and motions of other
Gallese, V. & Cuccio, V. (2015). Embodied Simulation: A Paradigm for the Constitution of Self and Others - A Reply to Christian Pfeiffer.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 14(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570962 2 | 5
www.open-mind.net
people’s  bodies,  in  this  way  contributing  to
both the foundation of the sense of self and so-
cial cognition. Empirical studies are reported to
support  these  claims.  In  addition,  empirical
data showing that  the vestibular  cortical  net-
work overlaps with neural structures underlying
the bodily foundation of both the sense of self
and others, as discussed in the two previous sec-
tions, are presented.
In the light of the empirical evidence dis-
cussed  in  his  commentary,  Christian  Pfeiffer
concludes that ES-as-motor-resonance is not a
sufficiently primary mechanism on which we can
base  a  unified  neurobiological  theory  of  the
earliest sense of self and others. In the next sec-
tion we answer these criticisms.
2 Responses
First, we would like to point out that ES is not
confined to motor resonance of others’ actions,
like that instantiated by macaques’ mirror neur-
ons, as in humans ES also encompasses the ac-
tivation of somatosensory areas during the ob-
servation of others’ tactile experiences, the ac-
tivation of  pain-related areas like the anterior
insula and the anterior cingulate cortex during
the observation of others’ pain, and the activa-
tion of the anterior insula and limbic structures
like the amygdala during the observation of oth-
ers’ emotions like disgust and fear (see our pa-
per, p. 9 and Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011a). Thus,
motor resonance only describes one partial as-
pect of ES. 
Two distinct arguments can be used to ex-
plain why we do not think that AS constitutes
a valid alternative to ES, as argued by Pfeiffer.
We certainly agree with Pfeiffer that shared at-
tention, that is, the capacity to direct the gaze
to an object gazed by someone else, is a basic
ingredient of social cognition. Indeed, as main-
tained by Colwyn Trevarthen (1977), shared at-
tention  marks  in  human  infants  around  9
months of  age the transition from primary to
secondary intersubjectivity. However, shared at-
tention constitutes only one aspect of intersub-
jectivity and social cognition, thus AS at best
only covers a partial aspect of social cognition
and therefore appears to be more limited than
ES in this respect. Furthermore, and most im-
portantly, shared attention can be linked to mo-
tor  resonance.  Shepherd,  Klein,  Deaner,  and
Platt 2009) discovered in macaques a class of
mirror neurons in the lateral intraparietal (LIP)
area  involved  in  oculomotor  control,  signaling
both when the monkey looked at a given direc-
tion  in  space  and  when  it  observed  another
monkey  looking  in  the  same  direction.  These
authors suggested that LIP mirror neurons for
gaze  might  contribute  to  the  sharing  of  ob-
served  attention.  This  evidence  shows  that
shared attention is not divorced from motor res-
onance, but actually requires it.
A further argument in our opinion demon-
strates that ES and AS should not be seen as
alternative  solutions  to  the  problem of  social
cognition. Multisensory integration is a pervas-
ive feature of parieto-frontal centers involved in
sensory-motor planning and control. Indeed an
influential theory about attention, the “Premo-
tor Theory of Attention” (see  Rizzolatti et al.
1987;  Rizzolatti et al. 1994) states that spatial
attention results from the activation of the same
“pragmatic”  circuits  that  program oculomotor
behavior and other motor activities, even if such
activation does not produce any overt motor be-
havior, thus qualifying as motor simulation. 
We  would  like  to  emphasize  even  more
strongly than we did in the paper that a crucial
role  of  the  cortical  motor  system is  precisely
that of integrating multiple sources of body-re-
lated  sensory  signals,  like  tactile,  visual  and
auditory stimuli (see our paper,  pp. 10–11; see
also  Gallese &  Sinigaglia 2010,  2011b;  Gallese
2014).  The  ventral  premotor  cortex  (vPMC)
might represent one of  the essential  anatomo-
functional bases for the motor aspect of bodily
selfhood, specifically because of its role in integ-
rating  self-related  multisensory  information.
This hypothesis is corroborated by clinical and
functional evidence showing the systematic in-
volvement  of  vPMC  with  body  awareness
(Ehrsson et al. 2004; Berti et al. 2005; Arzy et
al. 2006). This evidence demonstrates a tight re-
lationship between the bodily self-related mul-
timodal integration carried out by the cortical
motor areas specifying the motor potentialities
of one’s body and guiding its motor behavior
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and  the  implicit  awareness  one  entertains  of
one’s body as one’s own body and of one’s be-
havior as one’s own behavior.
The vPMC is  anatomically connected to
visual and somatosensory areas in the posterior
parietal cortex and to frontal motor areas and
for  this  reason it  is  plausible  to  assume that
vPMC activity reflects the detection of congru-
ent  multisensory  signals  related  to  one’s  own
body parts: this mechanism could be respons-
ible for the feeling of body ownership. The mo-
tor aspects of the bodily self-enable the integra-
tion of self-related multimodal sensory informa-
tion about the body and about the world with
which the body interacts, as epitomized by the
properties  of  macaques’  premotor  neurons  in
area F4 (see Fogassi et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al.
1997)  and the analogous  functional  properties
displayed by the human homologue of area F4
(see  Bremmer et al. 2001). The same neurons
controlling the movement in space of the head
or  of  the  upper  limb also  respond  to  tactile,
visual, and auditory stimuli, provided they are
applied to the same body part, like tactile stim-
uli,  or  they  occur  in  the  body-part-centered
peri-personal  space,  like  visual  and  auditory
stimuli. Thus, we think that ES and multisens-
ory integration should not be seen as alternative
solutions to the problem of the neural bases of
the bodily self, because multimodal integration
carried out by vPMC is an instantiation of ES.
We  agree  with  Pfeiffer,  however,  that  other
brain areas, like TPJ, might contribute to a co-
herent sense of one’s own body. It must be ad-
ded that TPJ is part of a network (including
the posterior parietal cortex, and the premotor
cortex)  implicated  in  multisensory  integration
during self-related and other-related events and
experiences. Indeed, as shown by  Ebisch et al.
(2011), the observation of others’ affective tact-
ile experiences leads to the activation of observ-
ers’ vPMC and second somatosensory area and
to the inactivation of observers’ posterior insula.
Functional connectivity revealed a significant in-
teraction  between  the  posterior  insula,  right
TPJ, left pre-central gyrus, and right posterior
parietal cortex during the observation of other’s
affective  touch.  These  data  suggest  that  TPJ
might be involved in mapping the self–other dif-
ferentiation, by means of lower-level computa-
tional mechanisms for generating, testing, and
correcting  internal  predictions  about  external
sensory events.
Last, we agree with Pfeiffer that the vesti-
bular  system  might  contribute  to  the  bodily
foundation of both the consciousness of self and
others  and  we  thank  him for  having  pointed
this out, thus integrating our perspective.
3 Conclusions
It seems that the data discussed in the previous
section allow us to come to the conclusion that
ES is the primary and earliest mechanism con-
tributing to the foundation of the sense of self
and others. That said, in conclusion, we would
like  to  stress  again  the issue  of  the  cognitive
role ES has in relation to language. Though the
aspect of the relation between ES and language
was not addressed in Pfeiffer’s commentary, this
was a central point of our proposal. The rela-
tion between ES and language is two-sided. On
the one hand, empirical evidence has shown the
role ES plays in language comprehension. These
data (for an overview see Gallese & Cuccio this
collection, p. 13) suggest that the bodily, sens-
ory, and motor dimensions play a constitutive
role  in  language,  both  ontogenetically  and
phylogenetically. On the other hand, being lin-
guistic creatures, we humans are the only living
species able to fix and relive specific aspects of
our  bodily  experiences  by  means  of  symbols.
Words  or  other  forms of  symbolic  representa-
tions such as art, for example, allow us to activ-
ate  and relive  our  bodily  experiences.  In this
way, by means of symbolic representations, we
can  share  our  bodily  experiences,  enacted  by
ES, even with people far away from us in time
and  space.  As  argued  in  our  paper,  ES  is  a
model of our own experiences and its defining
features are best explained by resorting to the
Aristotelian  notion  of  paradeigma.  ES-as-
paradeigma (and not just as motor resonance)
provides  a  neurobiologically-based  new  per-
spective  on  human  social  cognition  and  ulti-
mately on the very definition of human nature. 
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